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NOTE
COERCION'S COMMON THREADS: ADDRESSING
VAGUENESS IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL
PROHIBITIONS ON TORTURE BY LOOKING TO STATE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAWS
Sarah H. St. Vincent*
Under international law, the United States is obligated to crimi-
nalize acts of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
However, the federal criminal torture laws employ several terms
whose meanings are so indeterminate that they inhibit the stat-
utes' effectiveness and fail to provide adequate guidance
regarding precisely which forms of mistreatment may result in
prosecution. These ambiguous terms have given rise to serious
and prolonged controversies within the executive branch regard-
ing what torture is-controversies that confirm, and may further
compound, the uncertainty of liability under the laws in question.
In order to solve this problem of vagueness and provide definitive
guidance to persons in control of detainees, the torture statutes
should be revised to prohibit specific forms of mistreatment. This
task may be accomplished in a straightforward and logically con-
sistent manner by observing the commonalities between torture and
domestic violence, a form of abuse American states have sought to
eliminate by outlawing specific types of conduct. Torture and do-
mestic violence constitute two manifestations of the same
underlying behavioral phenomenon: the use of isolation, pain, and
humiliation to create a sense of fear and helplessness in the victim,
thereby increasing his or her willingness to comply with the abusive
party's demands. After establishing this fundamental similarity, this
Note proposes a prototype for a revised federal torture statute
based upon state domestic violence laws.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2011. The author is profoundly grateful to her note editors, Sada
Jacobson Baby and Matt Miller; to the other members of the notes office of the Michigan Law Re-
view who reviewed successive drafts; to Professor Julian Davis Mortenson for advising this research
and writing project; and to Emily Berman for her comments on an early version. Without their in-
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INTRODUCTION
What is torture?
In 2004, in the midst of a heated internal debate regarding the legality of
the use of particular techniques during the interrogations of counterterrorism
detainees, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel unequivocally
declared that "[tlorture is abhorrent both to American law and values and to
international norms."' Congress has long adhered to the same principle, con-
senting to the ratification of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT")-a treaty that
obligates state parties to criminalize all acts of torture under their domestic
1. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel, to James B. Comey, Deputy Att'y Gen., Re: Legal Standards Applicable
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at 1 (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Memo to James B. Comey]; see
also OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF
LEGAL COUNSEL'S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY'S USE OF "ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES" ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 110-45
(2009) [hereinafter OPR REPORT] (describing the debates occurring within the Justice Department
when the Memo to James B. Comey was issued).
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laws 2-and adopting several statutes banning torture and providing for
lengthy terms of imprisonment for persons convicted of this offense. Yet,
the question of which specific forms of detainee treatment should be re-
garded as criminally punishable acts of torture or cruel or inhuman
treatment remains the subject of both legal and popular controversy in the
United States.4 This lack of clarity is only compounded by the federal crimi-
nal laws that purport to ban the practice of torture, none of which includes
an explicit list of prohibited forms of detainee treatment.5
The legislative choice not to enumerate specific banned interrogation
techniques or detention conditions is understandable: would-be torturers are
creative, and the concern that they would inevitably be able to locate and
exploit loopholes in any list of prohibited forms of treatment is a legitimate
one.6 Notably, CAT and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR") adopt a similar approach, imposing blanket prohibitions
on torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment without listing spe-
cific prohibited acts.' In its official commentary to the ICCPR, the Human
Rights Committee has gone so far as expressly to reject the proposal that it
provide a list of acts that constitute torture per se, stating tersely that it does
not believe such an action is necessary. A majority of scholars who have
addressed the issue of torture under American domestic law appear to con-
cur, restricting themselves to analyses of whether particular techniques
qualify as torture under the laws as currently drafted, rather than suggesting
2. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment art. 2(1), Apr. 18, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A, 2441 (2006).
4. See, e.g., Claire Finkelstein & Michael Lewis, Debate, Should Bush Administration Law-
yers Be Prosecuted for Authorizing Torture?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 195, 205-24 (2010),
http://www.pennumbra.comldebates/pdfs/AuthorizingTorture.pdf (questioning whether acts ap-
proved in Justice Department memoranda constitute torture); Mark Danner, US Torture: Voices from
the Black Sites, N.Y. REV. BOOKs, Apr. 9, 2009, at 69 (describing certain U.S. interrogation tech-
niques as torture); Marc Thiessen, Op-Ed., A middle ground for interrogations, WASH. PosT, Feb.
22, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/22/
AR2010022202298.html (arguing that certain interrogation practices banned by President Obama
are not acts of torture).
5. See supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., United Nations, Committee against Torture, Consideration of reports submitted
by States parties under article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee
against Torture: France, 1 30, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/FRA/CO/4-6 (May 20, 2010) (expressing concern
that the experimental use of Tasers in detention facilities may constitute torture); United Nations,
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, 179, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (May 27, 2008) (expressing a concern in
1982 that "countries where science and medicine are highly developed" might conduct cross-border
medical experiments upon persons who have not consented in a manner that constitutes torture).
7. CAT, supra note 2, at art. 1(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.
7, adopted on Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
8. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CCPR General Comment
No. 20: Article 7, 1 4 (Mar. 10, 1992), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/
69 2 4291970754969c 12563ed004c8ae5.
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that the laws themselves should be revised to clarify which specific forms of
detainee treatment are illegal and which are not.9
However, as the Justice Department has explicitly acknowledged,'0 the
federal provisions criminalizing torture currently employ several ambiguous
terms to define the elements of the crime. At minimum, this vagueness in-
hibits the laws' ability to do what they were intended to do: effectively
prevent torture, ensure that interrogations and detentions comply with the
Constitution and treaty law, and-most importantly for the purposes of this
analysis-provide adequate guidance to persons in control of detainees re-
garding which forms of mistreatment may lead to prosecution." It is also
possible that the statutes' facial ambiguity violates defendants' rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which requires the invali-
dation of a criminal statute if it "fails to ?rovide a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited."'
Evidence that the indeterminacy of key terms has undermined the effi-
cacy of the criminal torture statutes may be seen in the prolonged and
ongoing disputes within the government entities most responsible for com-
plying with and enforcing them. 3 These legal controversies have involved
such fundamental questions as, what constitutes torture? How should the
ambiguous or unsettled terms used to describe the mens rea, actus reus, and
result requirements in the criminal torture statutes be construed? Which
forms of detainee treatment are permissible under the laws, and which are
banned? Disputes regarding the answers to these questions have been con-
9. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, On "Waterboarding": Legal Interpretation and the Con-
tinuing Struggle for Human Rights, 32 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 203, 216 (2009) ("We have
clear enough [torture] definitions for many purposes, including to conclude that waterboarding ... is
... clearly illegal."); Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law: National Security Agendas, the Regu-
lation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. 1, 36-47 (2008) (alleging that the
Justice Department's finding in 2002 that certain coercive interrogation techniques are legal under
the torture statutes was not consistent with international law, without suggesting that the statutes
should be amended).
10. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 108-767, at § 1091(b)(1), (3) (2004) (Conf. Rep.) (stating, in
response to the disclosure of abuses at the Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq, that "[iut is the
policy of the United States to . . . ensure that no detainee shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment or punishment that is prohibited by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States" and to "ensure that all personnel of the United States Government understand
their obligations . .. to comply with the legal prohibitions against torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing treatment of detainees in the custody of the United States"); S. REP. No. 103-107, at § 706
(1994) (stating that the Torture Act was adopted in order to implement CAT and "establish[] appro-
priate penalties [for torture] taking into account the grave nature of the offense"); see also Padilla v.
Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (denying in part the defendant's motion to dismiss,
where the plaintiff-a former counterterrorism detainee-alleged that his subjection to interrogation
methods approved by the Justice Department as legal under the criminal torture statutes violated his
constitutional rights).
12. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008). Williams was a Fourteenth
Amendment case, but Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2719-20 (2010),
quotes and applies the Williams standard in the context of a Fifth Amendment due process claim,
suggesting that the same standard is used to evaluate vagueness under both the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments.
13. See infra Section I.B.
816 [Vol. 109:813
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tinuing within the executive branch for three decades, and seem likely to
prove intractable unless the texts of the laws are revised.14
Recently, a few legal commentators have begun to suggest that the laws
should be amended to include more explicit parameters regarding permissi-
ble and prohibited types of detainee treatment." This Note accepts their
argument, and further suggests that the best approach to revising the torture
statutes and addressing the problem of textual vagueness is to make changes
based on state domestic violence laws. As demonstrated below, both coer-
cive interrogations and domestic violence rely upon the same basic
behavioral strategy: the use of isolation, physical pain, and psychological
degradation to create a sense of helplessness and dependence in the victim,
thereby obtaining his or her compliance with the interrogator's or abusive
partner's demands. The two forms of abuse are virtually identical in this
key respect, and while clear differences remain where the particular nature
of the relationship between the perpetrator and victim is concerned, these
differences do not affect the analysis. 7
It is therefore possible to look to state domestic violence laws in order to
derive a list of specific acts that produce a degree of pain or suffering the
American population finds to be morally intolerable when inflicted for the
purpose of obtaining compliance. With some modifications, this list can
then be incorporated into the statutes that govern detainee treatment. This
framework offers a logically consistent solution to the problem of defining
and outlawing torture in a manner that is unambiguous and comprehensive,
and that provides adequate notice to persons in control of detainees regard-
ing which forms of treatment may not be inflicted. It is also consistent with
a gradual move within the legislative and executive branches toward speci-
fying which interrogation methods are permitted and which are off-limits.
The analysis in this Note focuses exclusively on persons in control of
detainees and their ability to forecast with certainty which types of treat-
ment may lead to criminal punishment for torture or cruel or inhuman
treatment. It does not address any substantive rights to freedom from torture
14. See infra Section I.B (discussing these controversies concerning statutory construction
and application).
15. See, e.g., JOHN T. PARRY, UNDERSTANDING TORTURE 42 (2010) (suggesting that a new
CAT protocol "could include a nonexclusive list of conduct that constitutes torture"); Sanford Lev-
inson, In Quest of a "Common Conscience": Reflections on the Current Debate About Torture, J.
NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y, Winter 2005, at 231 (arguing that legal scholars should examine coer-
cive interrogations from factual and contextual perspectives and create a clearer delineation of the
crime of torture); Michael W. Lewis, A Dark Descent into Reality: Making the Case for an Objec-
tive Definition of Torture, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2010) (discussed infra Part II).
16. See infra Part H.
17. See infra Section II.B.
18. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1402(a), 119 Stat. 3475
(2006) [hereinafter DTA] (restricting permissible forms of treatment of persons "in the custody or
under the effective control of the Department of Defense or under detention in a Department of
Defense facility" to those authorized in the Army Field Manual on interrogation, discussed infra




that a detainee may be able to assert under international or domestic law in a
civil case, largely because the extent to which detainees held by the United
States in various locations and under various statutory schemes enjoy consti-
tutional or other protections remains unsettled.'9 It is also solely concerned
with prospective liability, rather than the question of whether interrogation
methods the United States has authorized and employed in the past should
have been regarded as criminal acts of torture under the laws as they existed
at the time.
Part I demonstrates that the federal laws criminalizing torture are so fa-
cially indeterminate that they have given rise to serious and intractable legal
controversies regarding which particular forms of detainee treatment they
prohibit. Part II describes the commonalities between coercive interroga-
tions and domestic violence, establishing that the two types of abuse are
simply context-specific manifestations of the same behavioral phenomenon.
On the basis of these observations, Part III draws upon state domestic vio-
lence laws in creating a revised federal torture statute that prohibits specific
forms of mistreatment. While this prototype statute would require additional
refinement prior to adoption, it nevertheless provides a practical and consis-
tent framework for solving the problem of vagueness described in Part I.
I. VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE IN THE FEDERAL TORTURE
STATUTES HAS CREATED INTRACTABLE LEGAL CONTROVERSIES
Taken together, the provisions of federal law criminalizing torture dem-
onstrate an apparently sincere desire on the part of Congress to eliminate
20' 22this type of mistreatment.20 Similarly, courts2' and the executive branch
have recognized for decades that torture committed by persons acting under
color of law violates the law of nations; when submitting CAT to the Senate
for ratification, the Reagan Administration even suggested that the crime
should be subject to a form of universal jurisdiction. Plainly, within the
19. See, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the protections
of the Suspension Clause do not extend to alien detainees held under the authority of the executive
branch at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan); Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 108-09
(D.D.C. 2010) (concluding that special factors preclude alien detainees from bringing actions
against federal officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) for alleged mistreatment in violation of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments,
without reaching the issue of whether Congress may constitutionally strip the federal courts of ju-
risdiction over all claims by "enemy combatant[s]" held at Guantanamo related to the conditions of
their confinement).
20. See supra notes 3, 11, 18.
21. E.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980); Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir. 1992).
22. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, 12-20, Filartiga, 630 F.2d
876 (No. 79-6090) [hereinafter Memo for the U.S.].
23. Ronald Reagan, Message to the Senate, DEP'T ST. BULL., August 1988, at 79, 79. The
precise meaning of "universal jurisdiction" remains unsettled in international law, although it is
generally taken to mean "jurisdiction to prescribe in the absence of any other accepted jurisdictional
nexus," such as territory or nationality, "at the time of the relevant conduct." Roger O'Keefe, Uni-
versal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 735, 744-46 (2004). For
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three branches of government, there is a consensus that torture is a heinous
offense that violates fundamental principles of justice.24
In this spirit, in the early 1990s the United States became a party to CAT
and the ICCPR, both of which place absolute and non-derogable bans on
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.2 The ICCPR provides
simply that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment" and that "[a]ll persons deprived of their
liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dig-
nity of the human person." 26 CAT includes a more complete definition of
torture, providing that the term means:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or in-
timidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity."
Despite the sweeping character of these prohibitions, the United States
has entered reservations to the two treaties that make it clear that the country
considers itself to be bound only by the provisions concerning torture and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment to the extent that they coincide with
21
domestic legal understandings of those terms. Since courts have uniformly
the purposes of CAT, the Reagan Administration understood it to mean that "[ejach State Party is
required either to prosecute torturers who are found in its territory or to extradite them to other
countries for prosecution." Reagan, supra.
24. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936) (quoting Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)) ("[Torture] offends [a] principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of [the American] people as to be ranked as fundamental." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
25. CAT, supra note 2, at arts. 1, 2(2), 16; ICCPR, supra note 7, at arts. 4, 7. Under both
international and American law, there is a distinction between torture and lesser acts of mistreatment
that do not rise to the level of torture but nevertheless are severe enough to be banned. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(B) (2006); CAT, supra note 2; ICCPR, supra note 7; Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla,
No. 08-1696, 2010 WL 3001986, at *41-45 (D. Md. July 29, 2010). However, as acknowledged by
the Committee against Torture, "[i]n practice, the definitional threshold between ill-treatment and
torture is often not clear." Committee against Torture, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: General Comment No. 2: Implementation of
article 2 by States parties, 3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008). Article 7 of the ICCPR,
supra note 7, supports the contention that both torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
are banned on equal terms, accord PARRY, supra note 15, at 37-38. The alleged legal distinctions
between the two forms of mistreatment are therefore not directly relevant to the analysis presented
in this Note, although they might serve as grounds for modification of the prototype statute pro-
posed infra Part III.
26. ICCPR, supra note 7, at arts. 7, 10(t).
27. CAT, supra note 2, at art. 1(1) (excluding from the definition "pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions").
28. 138 CONG. REC. 8070-71 (1992) (enumerating the United States' reservations, declara-
tions, and understandings with regard to the ICCPR); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Declaration and Reservations: United States,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSGI'olume%
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indicated that CAT's provisions are not self-executing, 29 and since Congress
has never passed legislation implementing the ICCPR,30 prosecutors and
defendants must necessarily look to U.S. law when seeking to determine
whether a criminal act of torture has occurred.
However, the statutory scheme regulating the treatment of detainees by
American nationals or in American custody is complex, with several over-
lapping criminal laws purporting to ban the practices of torture and cruel or
inhuman treatment.3 As discussed below, none of these laws provide a clear
and comprehensive definition of the crime of torture, with the arguable ex-
ception of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA").32 This legislative
failure to impose universal and unambiguous limitations on permissible
forms of detainee treatment has given rise to several serious controversies,
particularly within the executive branch, concerning the proper interpreta-
tion and application of the laws. These unresolved disputes, in turn, create a
danger of legal uncertainty for persons who exercise control over detainees,
as well as a danger that acts of severe mistreatment will not be prevented or
punished. The courts appear unlikely to resolve this uncertainty in the fore-
seeable future," meaning that the statutes' facial vagueness-in addition to
20I/Chapter%201V/IV-9.en.pdf [hereinafter CAT Reservations]; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Declarations and Reservations: United States, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/doclPublication/MTDSGIVolume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf [hereinafter
ICCPR Reservations]. The United States' reservations to CAT impose a unique definition of the
crime of torture; this definition has subsequently been incorporated into domestic legislation such as
the War Crimes Act and the Torture Act. See infra Section I.A. 1. The reservations also provide that
the term "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," as used in CAT, shall only pre-
clude acts that are "prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States." CAT Reservations, supra.
29. See, e.g., Renkel v. United States, 456 F.3d 640, 642-44 (6th Cir. 2006); Raffington v.
Cangemi, 399 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2005); Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 133 n.7 (3d Cir. 2005).
30. See Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the ICCPR's
provisions are not enforceable in domestic courts because the treaty is not self-executing and lacks
implementing legislation in the United States).
31. See infra Section I.A.
32. See discussion infra Section I.A.2. The DTA bars the use of interrogation practices not
authorized by the Army Field Manual on human intelligence collection, while creating a good-faith
exception to liability under the criminal torture statutes for those who act in reasonable reliance
upon an official finding that a form of detainee treatment does not constitute torture. DTA, supra
note 18, at §§ 1402, 1404. The current Army Field Manual supersedes the version referred to in the
DTA. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52): HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERA-
TIONs vi (2006) [hereinafter ARMY FIELD MANUAL].
33. The criminal torture laws applicable to civilians appear to have resulted in only one
conviction since the Torture Act was passed in 1994, suggesting that the courts are not likely to
address the meaning of the statutes' terms comprehensively in the foreseeable future. See United
States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 793, 799 (11th Cir. 2010) (confirming that the defendant, indicted in
2007, was the first person to be prosecuted under the Torture Act). Meanwhile, most civil cases
concerning detainee abuses allegedly committed as part of American counterterrorism initiatives
have almost uniformly been dismissed on unrelated grounds. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d
559 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing suit on grounds that special factors precluded action against individ-
ual officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (dis-
missing suit on the basis of Bivens factors), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009); Saleh v. Titan
Corp., 580 E3d I (D.C. Cir. 2009) (dismissing suit on grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction
under Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)); El Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir.
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being potentially unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment4-is likely to continue to give rise to heated controversy unless
Congress substantially revises the laws' provisions.
The texts of the criminal torture statutes are set forth in Section L.A be-
low, with particular attention to terms that are not adequately defined or that
otherwise make it difficult to discern whether a given form of detainee
treatment is prohibited. Section I.B then describes the ongoing legal contro-
versies that have arisen from the legislature's failure to adopt more specific
definitions of torture and cruel or inhuman treatment. These controversies
provide additional evidence that the statutes are not sufficiently clear to en-
able persons in control of detainees to ascertain with confidence which types
of treatment may lead to the lengthy terms of imprisonment or capital pun-
ishment that result from a torture conviction.
A. The Terms Used to Define the Elements of the
Crime of Torture Are Vague or Ambiguous
1. The War Crimes Act and the Torture Act
The War Crimes Act of 1996 was intended to criminalize grave breaches
36
of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions under U.S. domestic law,
and purports to ban acts of torture committed by or upon U.S. nationals or
members of the U.S. armed forces during non-international armed
2007) (dismissing suit on the grounds that litigation would lead to the disclosure of state secrets),
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (2007). But see AI-Quraishi v. Nakhla, No. 08-1696, 2010 WL 3001986
(D. Md. July 29, 2010) (allowing an Alien Tort Statute claim to proceed against American private
military contractors who allegedly committed acts of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment in Iraq); Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (allowing Bivens action to
proceed against the author of George W. Bush-era legal memoranda authorizing interrogation tech-
niques).
34. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (stating that the failure "to pro-
vide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits" is
sufficient to render a criminal law impermissibly vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment); see also Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("No one may be required
at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.").
35. Under the War Crimes Act, a conviction for torture will result in a fine or imprisonment
for life or a term of years, or-if the victim dies as a result of the criminal act-the death penalty. 18
U.S.C. § 2441(a) (2006). Under the Torture Act, a conviction for torture will result in a fine or im-
prisonment for up to twenty years, or-if the victim dies-imprisonment for life or the death
penalty. Id. § 2340(a).
36. Whether the Geneva Conventions themselves, see, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, are self-
executing and enforceable in American courts is a question that remains unresolved. See Noriega v.
Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002 (2010) (Thomas, 3., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Where criminal
prosecution in American courts is concerned, however, Congress has explicitly commanded that
"[n]o foreign or international source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the courts of
the United States in interpreting the prohibitions" of the War Crimes Act. Military Commissions Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a)(2), 120 Stat. 2600, 2632 (2006). Thus, it appears exceedingly
unlikely that any individual would be prosecuted in U.S. courts for violations of the Geneva Con-
ventions themselves, rather for violations of the domestic laws that implement the conventions.
conflicts. 7 Liability may result regardless of whether the act in question was
committed within or outside the United States, so long as it took place "in
the context of and in association with" a non-international armed con-
flict-a category that includes the hostilities between the United States and
Al Qaeda. 9
Under the act, "torture" is defined as:
The act of a person who commits, or conspires or attempts to commit, an
act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffer-
ing (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon
another person within his custody or physical control for the purpose of
obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion,
40
or any reason based on discrimination of any kind.
The law also prohibits "[c]ruel or inhuman treatment," defined as "an act
intended to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffering
(other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions), including seri-
ous physical abuse, upon another within [the defendant's] custody or
control." 41 "Severe mental pain or suffering," in turn, is defined by reference
to the Torture Act (discussed below), which provides that the term means:
[P]rolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from-
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain
or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or appli-
cation, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to
disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, se-
vere physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of
mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt pro-
41
foundly the senses or personality ....
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2441.
38. Id. § 2441(c)(3).
39. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628-31 (2006).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(A).
41. Id. § 2441(d)(1)(B). The War Crimes Act criminalizes rape, sexual assault or abuse,
mutilation, maiming, and serious bodily injury in separate provisions. Id. § 2441(d)(1)(E)-(H).
"[S]erious bodily injury" is defined as bodily injury involving "a substantial risk of death," "extreme
physical pain," "protracted and obvious disfigurement," or the "protracted loss or impairment of the
function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty" Id. § 2441(d)(2)(B) (adopting the definition
of serious bodily injury used in 18 U.S.C. § 113(b)(2), which itself adopts the definition used in 18
U.S.C. § 1365(h)(3)).
42. Id. § 2340(2). The meaning of "other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the
senses or the personality" remains disputed. See PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BREAK THEM
DowN: SYSTEMATIC USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE BY US FORCES 104 (2005), available at
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/report-2005-may.html.
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The list of acts found in this definition of mental pain or suffering ap-
pears to be exclusive, such that a defendant who specifically intended to
inflict psychological distress through unlisted acts such as sexual assault or
isolation, no matter how debasing or prolonged, would not be liable for tor-
ture.43 Meanwhile, the term "severe physical ... pain or suffering" remains
undefined, despite its critical importance. Notably, for the purposes of liabil-
ity for cruel or inhuman treatment, the law defines "serious physical pain or
suffering" as bodily injury involving, inter alia, "extreme physical pain," "a
substantial risk of death," or the "significant loss or impairment" of a limb
or organ.4 Given that "serious" is a lesser standard than "severe" under the
War Crimes Act, it is difficult to imagine what degree of pain would be re-
garded as sufficiently agonizing for liability for torture to result under this
legislation; the text of the law leaves the issue unresolved.
The definition of torture found in the Torture Act of 1994, whose crimi-
nal provisions are applicable to all American nationals acting under color of
law outside the United States (regardless of whether any form of armed con-
flict exists), is substantially similar to that found in the War Crimes Act,
retaining the same terminology with regard to physical and mental pain or
suffering as well as the specific intent requirement. 45 "[S]evere mental pain
or suffering" is defined as described above, while the meaning of "severe
physical . .. pain or suffering," as under the War Crimes Act, is not specified
in the text.4 Similarly, the Torture Act, like the War Crimes Act, provides no
explanation of the mens rea standard of specific intent-an omission that, as
discussed below, has given rise to extended confusion and controversy.4 7
2. The Detainee Treatment Act
Adopted in the wake of revelations of abuses by U.S. Army personnel at
the Abu Ghraib prison facility in Iraq, the DTA provides that "[n]o person in
the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense or
under detention in a Department of Defense facility" shall be subject to any
form of treatment not expressly authorized in the Army Field Manual on
Human Intelligence Collector Operations ("Army Field Manual"). 48 At the
43. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Office
of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at 8 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memo] (ar-
guing that prolonged mental harm must result from one of the predicate acts listed in the statute).
OPR REPORT, supra note 1, did not refute this conclusion.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(2)(D) (emphasis added).
45. Id. §§ 2340(1), 2340A.
46. Id. § 2340(1)-(2).
47. In addition to being ambiguous, this specific intent requirement is notably in tension with
the provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice prohibiting "cruelty toward, or oppression or
maltreatment" of detainees, an offense that requires only general intent. 10 U.S.C. § 893 (2006); see
also United States v. Hanson, 30 M.J. 1198, 1201 (A.F.C.M.R. 1990).
48. DTA, supra note 18; see also Arsalan M. Suleman, Recent Developments, Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, 19 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 257, 257-58 (2006). The use of the passive voice in
this statute-"shall be subject," DTA, supra note 18-suggests that a violator may be prosecuted
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same time, it provides that in any criminal prosecution of a U.S. official,
agent, or member of the armed forces for abuses committed during counter-
terrorism interrogations, "it shall be a defense" that the acts in question
"were officially authorized and determined to be lawful at the time that they
were conducted" and that the defendant reasonably lacked awareness that
the acts were unlawful. 49 Thus, although the act's provisions are not criminal
statutes, the legislation-in combination with the Army Field Manual-
essentially specifies some types of detainee treatment that will not result in
criminal liability.
Like the War Crimes Act and the Torture Act, the DTA may initially ap-
pear to offer substantive guidance to persons in control of detainees,
particularly since the current Army Field Manual expressly prohibits a num-
ber of forms of coercive treatment.50 However, the act's reliance on the
manual to supply precise limits on detainee treatment remains problematic
for several reasons. Most importantly for the purposes of the present analy-
sis, the manual itself expresses uncertainty regarding the legality of the
techniques it authorizes, stating that "certain applications of approaches and
techniques may approach the line between permissible actions and prohib-
ited actions" and warning that "[ilt may often be difficult to determine
where permissible actions end and prohibited actions begin."" These equi-
vocal cautionary statements indicate that the manual, standing alone, cannot
provide sufficient guidance regarding prospective liability for torture or
cruel or inhuman treatment. Additionally, as mentioned above, the manual is
issued by the Department of Defense and may be altered unilaterally at any
time, meaning that the United States' consideration of particular forms of
detainee treatment as lawful or unlawful remains unpredictable and subject
to sudden change, potentially inhibiting the foreseeability of criminal prose-
cution."
regardless of his or her nationality or institutional affiliation, as long as the custody and control
requirements are met. However, the scope of the act contains significant gaps, as it does not apply to
persons detained in CIA facilities or interrogated by Americans in foreign prisons. Suleman, supra,
at 260. An executive order issued in early 2009, Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893, 4894
(Jan. 22, 2009), fills these gaps, but as a presidential directive, it remains revocable.
49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd-l(a) (West Supp. 2010). This provision was inserted late in the
drafting process in order to avoid a presidential veto. Suleman, supra note 48, at 257-58.
50. These include, inter alia, waterboarding, mock executions, the infliction of physical pain,
forced nudity and sexual abuse, electric shock, the induction of "hypothermia or heat injury," and
deprivation of "necessary food" or medical care. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 32, 15-75. The
manual continues to permit a number of forms of detainee treatment that leading civil rights organi-
zations have criticized as abusive. E.g., The Army Field Manual: Sanctioning Cruelty?, AMNESTY
INT'L, (Mar. 19, 2009, 2:58 PM), http://www.amnesty.org.au/hrs/comments/20575/; see also Close
Torture Loopholes in the Army Field Manual, CENTER FOR CONST. RTs., http://ccrjustice.org/get-
involvedlaction/close-torture-loopholes-army-field-manual (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
51. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 32, 1 5-76.
52. See Suleman, supra note 48, at 261.
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B. Prolonged Legal Controversies Confirm and
Compound the Vagueness of the Statutes
The facial vagueness of the current definitions of torture under federal
law has led to protracted controversies among government bodies regarding
what torture is-controversies that not only confirm, but may also exacer-
bate, the uncertainty of the statutes' application. An August 2002
memorandum by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel concern-
ing the meaning of the federal torture laws and their applicability to CIA
interrogators-often referred to as the "Bybee Memo," after Jay Bybee, the
assistant attorney general who signed it-may be the best-known example
of these struggles to provide definitive guidance regarding the parameters of
liability for torture. However, efforts by the executive branch to clarify what
exactly constitutes the crime of torture have been proceeding in earnest for
more than thirty years, with little progress-a situation that has not been
remedied by the passage of the War Crimes Act, the Torture Act, or the
DTA.
In an amicus curiae brief filed in support of the appellants in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala4 in 1979, the Carter Administration expressed support for a
broad definition of the crime of torture." The definition it provided was sub-
stantially similar to the one later incorporated into CAT, employing a mens
rea of general intent and banning any act by which a person acting in an
official capacity inflicts severe physical or mental pain or suffering for a
prohibited purpose, such as obtaining information or a confession. How-
ever, the Reagan Administration adopted a sharply different view when
submitting CAT to the Senate for ratification only nine years later, urging
the legislators to attach reservations to several of the convention's key provi-
sions. In particular, the administration suggested that liability for torture
should be restricted to "extreme" and "unusually cruel" acts such as "sus-
tained systematic beating, application of electric currents to sensitive parts
of the body'" or "tying up or hanging in positions that cause extreme pain."5 1
It also supported the imposition of a highly restrictive mens rea requirement,
stating that "in order to constitute torture, an act must be ... specifically
intended to inflict excruciating and agonizing physical or mental pain or
suffering." 9 This specific intent would not be present, the administration
53. Bybee Memo, supra note 43, at 3-5.
54. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
55. See Memo for the U.S., supra note 22, at 17-18. The United States sided with the appel-
lants in arguing that torture violates the law of nations and is therefore cognizable under the Alien
Tort Statute. Id. at 3, 12-20.
56. Id. at 17-18. The definition was drawn from the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 1(1), G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3452 (Dec. 9, 1975), which pre-
ceded CAT.
57. S. EXEC. Doc. No. 101-30, at 7 (1990) [hereinafter REAGAN DOCUMENT].
58. Id. at 13-14.
59. Id. at 15.
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maintained, where the party inflicting such pain or suffering acted in "self-
defense or defense of others"-an exception that may have been designed to
preclude liability in so-called "ticking time bomb" scenarios. 0 Thus, only
extremely harsh and essentially sadistic acts of detainee abuse would have
been punishable under this understanding of the crime.
As the Senate engaged in final negotiations concerning the reservations
in 1990, the George H. W. Bush Administration continued to support the
imposition of a mens rea requirement of specific intent, but no longer in-
sisted that this intent must involve a desire to inflict pain or suffering that is
11 61"excruciating and agonizing" (an interpretation the Senate had rejected).
However, with regard to the actus reus, the Justice Department continued to
promote the view that torture is limited to "conduct the mere mention of
which sends chills down one's spine: the needle under the fingernail, the
application of electric shock to the genital area, the piercing of eyeballs,
etc."62 The final version of the Senate's reservations is ambiguous on this
point, stating that "in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering," but omitting
any mention of "unusually cruel" or "extreme" conduct.
Left with this legacy of uncertainty, and receiving little assistance from
the indeterminate language of the Torture Act and War Crimes Act, the ex-
ecutive branch in the post-September 11 era has continued to struggle to
provide a legally supported and lasting interpretation of any of the elements
of the crime of torture. These ongoing controversies support the contention
that the statutes are vague, and may also further inhibit the ability of persons
in control of detainees to forecast with certainty whether the use of particu-
lar interrogation techniques or detention conditions will someday result in
criminal prosecution.
Observing that the term "severe" remains undefined with respect to
physical pain or suffering under the Torture Act, the Justice Department fa-
mously advised the president's counsel in the August 2002 Bybee Memo
that the victim's physical pain "must be equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of
bodily function, or even death" in order for torture liability to result.6 Re-
garding the provision's specific intent requirement, the memo's authors
concluded that the infliction of severe pain or suffering must have been the
60. Id. at 16; see also John T. Parry, Torture Nation, Torture Law, 97 GEo. L.J. 1001, 1038
(2009) (noting that the Reagan Administration's reference to "legitimate acts of self-defense or
defense of others," REAGAN DOCUMENT, supra note 57, at 16, "[I]eft unclear, perhaps deliberately
... whether this understanding would have made room for other common law defenses-such as
necessity-that might have been in greater tension with the non-derogable ban on torture").
61. OPR REPORT, supra note 1, at 184-85 (2009); Parry, supra note 60, at 1039-40.
62. Parry, supra note 60, at 1040 (quoting Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 16 (1990) (statement of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant
Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice)).
63. CAT Reservations, supra note 28, at 7.
64. Bybee Memo, supra note 43, at 1.
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defendant's "precise objective."6 A defendant could therefore escape liabil-
ity by showing that he merely knew that "severe pain or suffering was
reasonably likely to result from his actions," by demonstrating that he had
acted "with a good faith belief that his conduct would not produce the result
that the law prohibits," by asserting a necessity defense, or by showing that
his act was one of individual or collective self-defense.6 Where individual
techniques were concerned, the memo suggested that courts were not likely
to regard coercive forms of detainee treatment as torture unless the acts in
question were at least as extreme as those that had previously resulted in
damages against foreign perpetrators under the Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991, a civil statute enabling victims of torture (including foreign
67
nationals) to sue foreign perpetrators for damages in U.S. courts. Repre-
sentative examples of such acts, the memo claimed, included "severe
beatings" with iron bars, rape, mock executions, and electric shocks to the
genitalia.
In a second memorandum issued on the same date (and sometimes de-
scribed as the "Classified Bybee Memo"), the Justice Department went on
to find that ten specific interrogation techniques were legal under the Torture
Act, including grasping a detainee by the face or throat with both hands;
slamming him into a "flexible false wall"; striking him in the jaw with an
open hand; confining him in a dark space small enough to prevent him from
standing or fully extending his limbs; confining him in such a small, dark
space with insects; forcing him to lean forward against a wall with his arms
extended, supporting his weight with his fingertips; placing him in other
stress positions, such as "kneeling on the floor while leaning back at a 45
degree angle"; depriving him of sleep for up to eleven consecutive days; and
subjecting him to waterboarding, a form of asphyxiation. Although the
memorandum made no mention of this fact, the CIA and FBI were already
embroiled in fierce disputes regarding the legality of these techniques under
the torture laws-disputes that proved to be irreconcilable, with the FBI
eventually refusing to permit its agents to participate in any counterterrorism
interrogation involving the use of such methods.70
65. Id. at 3.
66. Id. at 3-4, 39-46. The memo did acknowledge that "when a defendant knows that his
actions will produce the prohibited result,' the factfinder will be likely to infer that he acted with
specific intent. Id. at 4.
67. Id. at 2, 22-27; see also Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 Note
(West 2006).
68. Bybee Memo, supra note 43, at 24-27. The OPR report later criticized this characteriza-
tion of jurisprudence under the Torture Victim Protection Act, finding that the Bybee Memo
"focused on the more brutal examples of conduct courts have found to be torture, and downplayed
less severe examples in the reported decisions." OPR REPORT, supra note 1, at 186-90.
69. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of
Legal Counsel, to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency, Interrogation of al
Qaeda Operative 1-4 (Aug. 1, 2002).
70. OPR REPORT, supra note 1, at 33, 73.
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The Bybee Memo and Classified Bybee Memo thus provided some
guidance regarding specific acts the authors believed were permissible under
the criminal torture laws, notwithstanding the FBI's rejection of this guid-
ance as legally invalid. However, the Justice Department rescinded the
memos" less than two years after they were issued due to an apprehension
that they might have been legally unsound and, six months later, embraced a
new interpretation of the laws. 72 This new interpretation emphasized that in
order for pain to be considered "severe" for the purposes of torture liability,
it must be extreme, but need not be equivalent to the pain that would arise
from organ failure or death.7 Additionally, although the memorandum ac-
cepted the proposition that a good-faith defense could be used to negate the
specific intent requirement, it cast doubt on the idea that a defendant could
escape liability for torture on the grounds that he had acted in self-defense
or defense of others, suggesting that this argument confused intent with mo-
tive. 74 While reaffirming the legality of the CIA's use of most of the specific
interrogation methods it had approved in prior memoranda, the department
also began to express uncertainty and discomfort regarding the range of
techniques it had authorized: its advice to the CIA in early 2005 made the
striking assertion that "these are issues about which reasonable persons may
disagree," and included an explicit complaint that the department's analyses
"ha[d] been made more difficult by the imprecision of the statute."75
In late 2005, Congress took the lead in regulating interrogations, passing
first the DTA' and then, less than a year later, the Military Commissions Act
of 2006.7' The judiciary also began to assert a role in this regard with the
71. See Memo to James B. Comey, supra note 1, at 2. This memorandum was intentionally
drafted "in a form that could be released to the public" and does not refer explicitly to the Classified
Bybee Memo. Id. However, the reference to "prior opinions," id. at n.8, as well as subsequent inves-
tigations, suggest that the 2004 memo was intended to supersede both the Bybee Memo and the
Classified Bybee Memo, although the department had not yet completed an analysis to replace the
Classified Bybee Memo, see infra note 72.
72. See Memo to James B. Comey, supra note 1, at 1-2. The memorandum to Comey re-
frained from explicitly stating that the interpretations of the criminal torture laws found in the Bybee
Memo were incorrect. Instead, it alluded to "[q]uestions" that had "been raised ... about various
aspects of the statutory analysis" in that memorandum, and asserted that "[wihile we have identified
various disagreements with the August 2002 Memorandum, we have reviewed [the Office of Legal
Counsel's] prior opinions addressing issues involving treatment of detainees and do not believe that
any of their conclusions would be different under the standards set forth in this memorandum." Id. at
1, 2 & n.8. Thus, the question of whether the Bybee Memo's analyses were incompatible with the
text of the laws remained unresolved.
73. Id. at 5-8.
74. See id. at 16-17.
75. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, Cent.
Intelligence Agency, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May
Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee 47 (May 10, 2005) [hereinafter
Bradbury Memo 1].
76. DTA, supra note 18.
77. Relevant provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 include sections 948r(b)-
(d) and 950v(b)( 11), which restricted the commissions' admission of statements obtained through
coercion and revised the War Crimes Act to include its current definition of torture. Military Comis-
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Supreme Court's June 2006 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which found
that the protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions apply
to all persons detained by the United States during non-international armed
conflicts, including the conflict with Al Qaeda. In the absence of more de-
finitive guidance from the courts or legislature, however, the executive
branch continued to face the task of interpreting federal torture laws on be-
half of the military and intelligence agencies, which it accomplished by
issuing the revised Army Field Manual'9 and by promulgating an executive
order allowing the CIA to continue to use harsh interrogation techniques
despite the ruling in Hamdan.8
The executive branch's interpretations of the torture laws shifted dra-
matically when the Obama Administration took office, demonstrating that
policymakers remain divided regarding how the terms used in the laws
should be understood. First, on January 22, 2009, the president signed an
executive order declaring that no interrogation of a detainee in U.S. custody
or control may utilize any method not approved in the Army Field Manual, a
stricture binding upon the CIA and other government agencies as well as the
military.8' Then, in February 2010, the Justice Department's Office of Pro-
fessional Responsibility ("OPR") publicly released a report reviewing the
George W. Bush-era memoranda concerning the torture laws, and finding
that the legal research and reasoning used to support the Bybee Memo and
Classified Bybee Memo were so flawed as to amount to professional mis-
conduct on the part of the drafter and signer.8 However, while willing to
state that these memos "did not represent thorough, objective, and candid
legal advice," the authors of the OPR report declined to provide their own
interpretation of the elements of the criminal torture statutes or explain
which forms of detainee treatment the statutes should be understood to pro-
hibit.8 Instead, they restricted themselves to observing, for example, that the
meaning of "specific intent" is "ambiguous" and "not use[d] consistently"
by the courts,8 and that the memos' drafter failed to cite adequate or appro-
priate legal sources in support of his interpretation of "severe pain."" The
sions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948r(b)-(d), 950v(b)(1 1) (2006), amended by 10 U.S.C.S.
§§ 948r(a), 950t(11)-(12) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2010).
78. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628-31 (2006). Although these provisions were not
the focus of the Court's decision, Common Article 3 prohibits, inter alia, "cruel treatment," "tor-
ture," and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment."
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 36, at art. 3(1) [herein-
after Common Article 3].
79. See supra Section I.A.2.
80. See Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007).
81. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
82. OPR REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. The report was disclosed to the press on February 19,
2010. See Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Report Faults 2 Who Wrote Terror Memos, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2010, at A9.
83. OPR REPORT, supra note 1, at 159-60.
84. Id. at 169.
85. Id. at 176-84.
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report's authors thus chose not to resolve the ultimate question of whether
the memos had "arrived at a correct result" in interpreting the statutes or
finding that certain interrogation techniques were legal under them."
The purpose of the foregoing discussion is not to critique the legal rea-
soning of various administrations or officials concerning the proper
interpretation of the torture statutes, or their views regarding the legality of
particular techniques under those statutes. Instead, it is intended to
demonstrate that despite decades of extensive legal debate and analysis
within the executive branch, the United States continues to lack a settled
legal understanding of what constitutes torture or cruel or inhuman treat-
ment. This lack of understanding has not been remedied by the passage of
the criminal torture statutes; in fact, the statutes' vague terminology remains
susceptible to sharply differing official interpretations-interpretations
whose fluctuations (in combination with the "imprecision" of the laws
themselves, as explicitly acknowledged by the Justice Department)7 have
contributed to a climate of near-total uncertainty regarding which forms of
detainee treatment the United States regards as torture. In light of the stat-
utes' stated purpose of providing effective prevention and predictable
criminal punishment of acts of torture and cruel or inhuman treatment," as
well as the risk of unconstitutional vagueness under the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, Congress should amend these laws to clarify which
types of mistreatment will result in prosecution.
II. COERCIVE INTERROGATIONS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
COMMON GROUND
Recently, Professor Lewis proposed that Congress address the non-
specificity of the torture laws by creating a rebuttable presumption that any
form of treatment military instructors are not permitted to inflict upon sol-
diers during training programs necessarily results in severe physical or
mental pain or suffering and therefore, in the context of detention or interro-
gation, constitutes torture." The logic underlying this argument has some
persuasive force: military instructors wield a power to inflict physical dis-
comfort and psychological stress upon soldiers in a manner akin to the
power wielded by interrogators over detainees, suggesting that it might be
appropriate to regulate the two sets of relationships in a similar fashion.
86. Id. at 160.
87. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 11.
89. Lewis, supra note 15, at 122. In addition to this basic stricture, Lewis would impose
"bright line" bans on certain egregious abuses, including "medical experimentation, exposure to
chemical/biological agents, murder, rape, mock executions, and mutilation." Id.
90. Lewis himself characterizes his approach as "[b]asing the treatment of detainees upon
the treatment afforded to one's own forces during wartime"-an idea for which he finds support in
international humanitarian law. Id. at 120-21. However, he does not clarify why the correct standard
under this framework should be the treatment that may be inflicted upon the members of one's own
forces during training (e.g., waterboarding), rather than while they are actually detained or impris-
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However, the settings and motives of military training and detention differ in
several critical respects. For example, military training is undertaken volun-
tarily, trainees know that the forms of treatment to which they are subjected
during training will not continue indefinitely, and trainees may be confident
that the military authorities overseeing the training, however harsh, have a
long-term interest in their well-being. The situation of counterterrorism de-
tainees differs dramatically in each of these respects, meaning that the
impact of various physically and psychologically coercive techniques on
detainees may be very different from (and much more severe than) their
impact on soldiers in training.9'
Another intuitive model for revising the torture statutes might entail the
derivation of a list of prohibited acts from international and foreign juris-
prudence. However, Congress has demonstrated hostility toward this
approach, both by attaching the reservations to CAT and the ICCPR de-
scribed in Section L.A above and by mandating that a court construing the
War Crimes Act may not use any "foreign or international source of law" as
the basis of its decision.93 Furthermore, international and foreign judicial
decisions concerning torture generally provide only post hoc, particularized
determinations regarding whether a certain form of detainee treatment con-
stituted torture. These isolated data points might help to inform revisions of
the torture laws, but it would be difficult to construct a comprehensive nor-
mative framework based upon them-especially where types of acts that
courts and tribunals have not yet addressed are concerned. This approach
could also give rise to further controversies within the government regarding
the correct interpretations of the foreign and international laws and deci-
sions in question, as indicated by past disagreements within the Justice
Department concerning the proper interpretation of relevant judgments of
the European Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court of Israel.9 4
oned. See id. at 133-35. This description of the logic underlying Lewis's argument is thus an infer-
ence, based primarily on his discussion of potential objections to the proposed framework. See id. at
129-35.
91. See S. ARMED SERVS. COMM., I10TH CONG., SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY xix (Comm. Print 2008). Addition-
ally, the Senate Armed Services Committee has stated that the harsh treatment inflicted on trainees
during the military's Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape ("SERE") training program-the
source of many of the interrogation techniques approved in the Bush-era memoranda-are abusive
and unlawful when applied to detainees. Id. at xxvii (finding that the "techniques used in SERE
school are inconsistent with the obligations of U.S. personnel under the Geneva Conventions" when
inflicted on detainees); see also Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, In Adopting Harsh Tactics, No Look
at Past Use, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at Al (confirming SERE as the source of the Bush-era inter-
rogation techniques).
92. See, e.g., HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. State 53(4) PD 817 [1999]
(Isr.); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1976); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac &
Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, I] 134-56 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June 12, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj0206l2e.pdf.
93. See supra notes 28, 36.




Assuming, then, that Congress would likely prefer to revise the torture
statutes by looking to American law, one is confronted with the task of
choosing-in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor conclusory-the state or
federal laws upon which it would be most appropriate to base these revi-
sions. For this purpose, a useful analogy may be drawn between coercive
interrogations and domestic violence, which all states have sought to eliminate
by adopting criminal statutes." In both public discourse and legal commen-
tary, coercive interrogations and domestic violence continue generally to be
96
regarded as entirely unrelated matters. However, as the discussion below
demonstrates, these two forms of abuse are rooted in the same basic behav-
ioral phenomenon: the use of pain, isolation, and humiliation to create a
sense of powerlessness and dependence in a resistant party, thereby gaining
compliance from him or her. The desired forms of compliance may differ,
but the ultimate goal-that of eroding the victim's individual identity and
will so that she or he ceases to resist the interrogator's or abusive partner's
demands-remains the same. These fundamental similarities support the
use of state domestic violence statutes as a model for remedying the vague-
ness problem in the federal torture laws, as proposed in Part III.
Section II.A shows that physically and psychologically coercive interro-
gations tend to follow a distinct pattern: first, the subject is isolated from the
outside world, including all persons who might be able to intervene to halt
the interrogation or provide emotional support. He is then forced to endure
painful or humiliating practices designed to reduce him to a state of hope-
lessness or learned helplessness so that he will be more willing to acquiesce
95. See 50 State Statutory Surveys: Criminal Laws: Crimes: Domestic Violence (Statutes),
0030 SURVEYS 7, at 6-7 (West 2009) [hereinafter State Surveys]; see also infra Part 111. A few
state penal codes, most notably California's, include a concept they describe as "torture"-with little
or no elaboration-as an aggravating circumstance for homicide. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a)(18) (West 2010). Such laws address the sadistic infliction of pain during the course of a
homicide, as distinct from the phenomenon of the use of isolation and physical or psychological
coercion as a means of obtaining compliance; they are therefore beyond the scope of this Note.
96. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Women's September 11th: Rethinking the International
Law of Conflict, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 8-9, 25-26 (2006) (noting that media reports and interna-
tional legal sources often categorically distinguish physical and sexual violence against women from
"torture"). But see Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/2, Eur. Ct. H.R., 125 (2009), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=33401&
sessionid=62123936&skin=hudoc-en (holding that a state's failure to intervene effectively in re-
peated and brutal acts of domestic violence against an individual may violate that individual's right
to freedom from torture).
97. It is true that the same phenomenon could be observed in the context of an ordinary
domestic prison. See, e.g., Philip G. Zimbardo et al., Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment:
Genesis, Transformations, Consequences, in OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES
ON THE MILGRAM PARADIGM 193, 200-01 (Thomas Blass ed., 2000). This fact might suggest that it
would be possible to develop a framework for reforms to the criminal torture statutes based on types
of treatment that guards and other personnel are not permitted to inflict upon inmates in domestic
prisons. Admittedly, prison personnel accused of mistreating inmates could-in addition to being
subject to civil suits-be charged with a criminal offense, such as battery. However, the selection of
such offenses from the full panoply of state criminal laws to which an abusive prison guard might be
subject, and the decision to include them in a revised criminal torture statute, would inevitably be an
arbitrary "cherry-picking" exercise. State domestic violence laws, by contrast, offer a pre-selected
and non-arbitrary set of behaviors that the states regard as criminally culpable when used in a man-
ner analogous to coercive interrogations.
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to the interrogating authority's demands. Section II.B then establishes that
the same pattern is employed by abusive partners in the domestic violence
context, and addresses several potential counterarguments.
A. Breaking the Will: Patterns of Coercion Used to
Obtain Compliance During Interrogations
Worldwide, coercive interrogations in countries with profound politi-
cal and cultural dissimilarities tend to involve surprisingly similar
methods. Many of these methods are physical, including beating, stress
positions, electric shock, starvation, rape, and suffocation or asphyxiation;
98however, acts of psychological manipulation and abuse are also common.
The short-term effect of these techniques is to isolate, frighten, and pro-
duce unbearable shame in the victim, creating a sense of helplessness and
dependence." This destruction of the individual will results, in turn, in a
greater willingness to comply with the interrogator's demands.'m Courts,
legal commentators, psychologists, and medical experts alike have agreed
that the fundamental aim of coercive interrogations is to "break" detainees
in this manner,'' a fact the Bush-era interrogation memoranda also repeat-
edly and explicitly acknowledged."02
As early as 1963, in the KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation
manual, the CIA encouraged the use of interrogation practices designed to
98. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, Spain: Briefing to Committee against Torture, AI Index
EUR/41/011/2009 29-33 (Nov. 1, 2009), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR41/
01 1/2009/en; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NOWHERE TO TURN: TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT IN UZ-
BEKISTAN (Nov. 2007), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/ngos/
hrwuzbekistan39.pdf (citing to Volume 19, No.6(D)); F9D9RATION INTERNATIONALE DES LIGUES
DES DROITS D'HOMME, REPORT ON FACT-FINDING MISSION TO YEMEN (Oct. 2009), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/ngos/FIDHYemen43.pdf. Common forms of psy-
chological coercion include blindfolding, stripping, prolonged isolation, sensory deprivation, mock
executions, threats of death or harm to the victim or others, and various forms of humiliation, some-
times interspersed with the occasional relief or reward. See id.; see also Ronald D. Crelinsten, In
Their Own Words: The World of the Torturer, in THE POLITICS OF PAIN: TORTURERS AND THEIR
MASTERS 38 (Ronald D. Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid, eds., 1995) (discussing the Khmer Rouge's
recommendation that interrogators alternate between comforting detainees and terrifying them or
working to instill a sense of hopelessness).
99. See, e.g., PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 48, 56 (reporting that psy-
chological coercion and sexual shaming in the interrogation context "destroy the victim's sense of
privacy, intimacy, trust of others and security, as well as [his] sense of self," leading to "deep feel-
ings of despair and self-loathing"); Zimbardo et al., supra note 97, at 200-01 (describing the 1971
Stanford prison experiment, in which volunteers playing the role of guards subjected volunteers
playing the role of prisoners to "humiliat[ing]" and "dehumaniz[ing]" techniques such as stripping,
sleep deprivation, isolation, and forced exercises until many of the objects of this treatment became
cowed and "zombie-like"); David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV.
1425, 1430-32 (2005) (observing that the "aim of torture is to turn its victim into someone who is
isolated, overwhelmed, terrorized, and humiliated," thereby eliminating his sense of individual free-
dom and dignity).
100. See PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 48.
101. See id. U.S. courts' observations on this subject are discussed below. See infra notes
114-118 and accompanying text.
102. These acknowledgments are discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 106-
113.
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reduce a detainee ("source") to an infant-like level of helplessness by
"[m]anipulating [him] psychologically until he becomes compliant":
Merely by cutting off all other human contacts, the interrogator monopo-
lizes the social environment of the source. .. . He exercises the powers of
an all-powerful parent, determining when the source will be sent to bed,
when and what he will eat, whether he will be rewarded for good behavior
or punished for being bad. The interrogator can and does make the sub-
ject's world not only unlike the world to which he had been accustomed
but also strange in itself-a world in which familiar patterns of time,
space, and sensory perception are overthrown.... For example, a source
who refuses to talk at all can be placed in unpleasant solitary confinement
for a time. Then a friendly soul treats him to an unexpected walk in the
woods.... Both the Germans and the Chinese have used this trick effec-
tively.'0o
The manual went on to recommend a variety of techniques aimed at "induc-
ing regression" by creating a sense of "fear and helplessness," including
manipulation of the detainee's sense of time, false flag,'" prolonged stand-
ing, isolation, sensory deprivation, removal of clothing ("because familiar
clothing reinforces identity and thus the [detainee's] capacity for resis-
tance"), and threats of pain.'os
As the Bush-era legal memoranda demonstrate, many of the enhanced
interrogation techniques the Justice Department authorized in the context of
the war on terror were expressly designed to humiliate, insult, shame, frigh-
ten, or shock detainees, thereby reducing them to a "baseline, dependent
state" or a state of learned helplessness.'06Before the interrogation began,
the detainee was to be reduced to an anonymous and dehumanized condi-
tion: "stripped of his clothes, shackled, and hooded, with the walling collar
over his head and around his neck."'07 The detainee would then be slammed
into a false wall in order to "shock or surprise" him and "wear down his
resistance." 0 8 Facial slaps could be used to "induce shock, surprise, or hu-
miliation"; similarly, water could be repeatedly flicked on the detainee "to
103. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, KUBARK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION 52-
53 (July 1963) [hereinafter KUBARK] (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), available at
http://www.gwu.edul-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 122/index.htm#kubark.
104. "False flag" is a term used to describe the practice of persuading a detainee that he is
being interrogated in a country other than the one where he is actually being held, or by authorities
from a country other than the one that is actually conducting the interrogation. ARMY FIELD MAN-
UAL, supra note 32, 8-69.
105. KUBARK, supra note 103, at 85-90, 92-95, 99.
106. See, e.g., Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, Cent.
Intelligence Agency, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain
Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees 53-54 (May 10, 2005) [hereinaf-
ter Bradbury Memo 2].
107. Id. at 55-56. The "walling collar" was intended to prevent head and neck injuries when
the detainee was slammed into a false wall. Id. at 55 n.4.
108. Bradbury Memo 1, supra note 75, at 10.
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instill humiliation, or to cause temporary insult."'"9 If the detainee was to be
subjected to sleep deprivation through prolonged shackling in a stress posi-
tion, he could be placed in an adult diaper, a technique the CIA embraced in
2002 as a deliberate form of humiliation."o Perhaps most crucially, nudity,
sleep deprivation, and dietary manipulation could all be used to reduce the
detainee to a state of utter dependency, demonstrating to him "that he has no
control over basic human needs.""' Ultimately, interrogators could use wa-
terboarding to make the detainee panic and fear for his life."2 The primary
goal of these techniques, the legal analyses stressed, was "to create a state of
learned helplessness and dependence conducive to the collection of intelli-
gence."'
In a line of cases dating back to 1897, American courts have roundly
condemned the tactic of obtaining a suspect's or detainee's compliance by
creating a sense of helplessness or dependency in this manner, regardless of
the legal context of, or circumstances surrounding, the detention.' '4 Perhaps
the best-known decision in this regard is Miranda v. Arizona, in which the
Court disapprovingly quoted several police manuals recommending that
suspects be completely isolated from the outside world during questioning,
and that the police interrogator "dominate his subject and overwhelm him
with his inexorable will to obtain the truth.""' This type of interrogation
environment, in the majority's assessment, was bound to put the party being
questioned "in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity for rational
judgment," undermining his human dignity and facilitating the violation of
his rights."' It was a desire to avoid the production of confessions (or other
forms of compliance) through such coercive techniques that led the Court to
require police to inform all persons taken into custody of their rights to re-
main silent and to consult with an attorney.'
109. Id. at 10, 12 (quoting a source that was redacted).
110. OPR REPORT, supra note 1, at 243. Later legal memoranda claimed that the diaper's
purpose was practical rather than psychological. See id.
111. Bradbury Memo 2, supra note 106 (quoting a source that was redacted).
112. See Bradbury Memo 1, supra note 75, at 41-42.
113. Bradbury Memo 2, supra note 106, at 10 (quoting a source that was redacted).
114. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (finding that the eight-hour
isolation and interrogation of a mentally ill man, "who is ignorant of his rights and who has been cut
off from the moral support of friends and relatives," violated the Fourteenth Amendment and was
"an effective technique of terror"); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532. 557-64 (1897) (finding that
statements "produced by inducements engendering either hope or fear" cannot be regarded as hav-
ing been given freely or voluntarily); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that
an interrogation involving the deliberate creation of a sense of hopelessness through incommunicado
detention, relentless questioning, and religious and sexual humiliation violated the suspect's Four-
teenth Amendment rights).
115. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 451 (1966) (quoting Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206).
116. Id. at 465.
117. Id. at 457.
118. Id. at 467-72.
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The above examples illustrate the modus operandi of physically and
psychologically coercive interrogations. As shown below, this pattern is es-
sentially identical to the patterns of coercion observed in domestic violence,
a phenomenon states have sought to eliminate by prohibiting specific types
of behaviors.
B. Coercion in Domestic Violence and Interrogations: A Shared Pattern
As recently as the 1970s, courts, law enforcement officials, and policy-
makers tended to view violence between intimate partners as temporary and
discrete events, the outgrowth of disagreements that were best resolved pri-
vately between the parties themselves."9 Meanwhile, psychologists frequently
diagnosed victims who failed to leave physically violent relationships as ma-
sochistic, believing that a low sense of self-worth led them to desire the
abuse. 20 Research conducted in last decades of the twentieth century, how-
ever, gave rise to profound changes in understandings of domestic violence,
with the result that behavioral scientists and health professionals no longer
regard victims as masochists, but as persons who have been physically and
psychologically coerced into complying with their partners' demands.121
Today, most psychologists, social workers, and sociologists who have
studied the problem view domestic violence as a behavioral pattern in which
abusers work to control their victims through tactics such as physical as-
sault, intimidation, false imprisonment, emotional degradation, the
destruction of property, or harm to third parties or pets.122 This pattern is
usually cyclical, beginning with a tension-building phase in which the ab-
user's threats or criticisms convey to the victim that she risks serious harm if
she does not comply with his demands; culminating in acute episodes of
battering or humiliation; and ending with contrite and generous behavior on
the part of the abuser in order to strengthen the emotional bond between the
abuser and the victim and convince the victim to remain in the relationship.'23
Throughout the cycle, abusers typically isolate their victims, forbidding them
from seeing family members, friends, or neighbors and preventing them from
maintaining employment.124 Victims who attempt to leave the relationship
often face stalking or threats of death or injury. 125Thus, although persons
119. Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic
Violence Policy, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1657, 1661-65.
120. Lenore Walker with Kate Richmond et al., History, in THE BATTERED WOMAN SYN-
DROME 21, 23 (Lenore E. A. Walker ed., 3d ed. 2009).
121. See Lenore E. Walker, Who are the Battered Women?, FRONTIERS: J. OF WOMEN STUD.,
Spring 1977, at 52.
122. See, e.g., Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaim-
ing Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1115-17 (2009).
123. Walker, supra note 121, at 53-54.
124. Johnson, supra note 122, at 1116.
125. See JILL DAVIES ET AL., SAFETY PLANNING WITH BATTERED WOMEN 23, 96 (1998);
Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Nat'l Institute of Justice & Ctrs. for Disease Control and Pre-
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who suffer domestic violence may initially have entered into relationships
with their partners voluntarily, their situation quickly comes to resemble that
of persons-such as counterterrorism detainees-who are held under du-
ress.
The specific behaviors used to gain compliance from domestic violence
victims often bear a strong resemblance to tactics employed during coercive
interrogations. For example, the defendant in the North Carolina case State
v. Norman, who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after shooting her
husband, had been subjected to physical abuses including slapping, kicking,
burning, and cutting.126 Her husband had also repeatedly threatened her with
death or serious injury, compelled her to engage in prostitution, deprived her
of food, ridiculed her in front of others, and "made her eat pet food out of
the pets' bowls and bark like a dog." 27 The abuser in Trujillo v. State locked
his partner into the house with a padlock, refused to allow her to use the
bathroom, forced her to strip, and subjected her to beating, burning, chok-
ing, and dousing with water. Perhaps most famously, Hedda Nussbaum,
whose partner Joel Steinberg was convicted of manslaughter following the
death of their illegally adopted daughter in 1987, has described Steinberg's
practice of isolating her from friends and family members; compelling her
to forage for her food in trashcans; beating her; and forcing her to crawl on
the floor, take baths in ice water, and ask for his permission before eating or
sleeping.129 Many of these techniques-including isolation, deprivation of
food or sleep, threats, sexual abuse, exposure to extreme temperatures, phys-
ical assault, dousing with water, suffocation or asphyxiation, and various
forms of humiliation-are identical to those that have been authorized or
documented in coercive interrogation contexts. 1o
These forms of domestic violence, like the coercive interrogation tech-
niques they so strongly resemble, result in fear, depression, dependence, and
learned helplessness, and thus in an erosion of the victim's will to resist the
abuser's demands. 13' Nussbaum has described this process as "brain-
wash[ing]," 32 and many psychologists and legal scholars agree, with some
suggesting that the phenomenon of learned helplessness in domestic vio-
lence victims closely resembles the forms of learned helplessness and
vention, Stalking in America: Findings From the National Violence Against Women Survey, RE-
SEARCH IN BRIEF, April 1998, at 1, 6-7.
126. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9-10 (N.C. 1989).
127. Id. at 10.
128. Trujillo v. State, 953 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Wyo. 1998).
129. Suzanne Daley, For Nussbaum, Journey To Understanding Is Slow, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
1988, at B 1; Corey Kilgannon, Hedda Nussbaum Promotes Her Memoir on Life With an Abuser,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2006, at B4; Francine Russo, The Faces of Hedda Nussbaum, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
30, 1997 (Magazine), at 26, 27.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 98, 103-105, 107-112.
131. Lenore Walker, Learned Helplessness, Learned Optimism and Battered Women, in THE
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME supra note 120, at 69, 72-73, 80-81.




post-traumatic stress disorder experienced by torture victims and prisoners
of war.'33
Critics may object that counterterrorism interrogations differ fundamen-
tally from domestic violence situations because interrogations, unlike the
abuse of an intimate partner, sometimes have the ostensible goal of extract-
ing information in order to prevent imminent harm.'3 For the purposes of
the present analysis, it suffices to observe, first, that neither international
human rights law nor international humanitarian law recognizes any form of
exception to the ban on torture, regardless of the circumstances or the tor-
turer's ostensible motive.' For example, the ICCPR-in an article to which
the United States did not attach reservations-states plainly that torture is
prohibited even during a "time of public emergency which threatens the life
of the nation,"'3 6 and CAT concurs that "[n]o exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political insta-
bility or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of
torture." 7 Nor have American courts given any indication that coercive in-
terrogation methods become permissible when there is a pressing need to
obtain information from the individual being questioned; to the contrary, the
courts have rejected this type of assertion, even in cases involving dangerous
serial criminals.'
Second, any argument that a defendant should not be liable for an act of
mistreatment because of the circumstances surrounding the act, rather than
because the act itself did not constitute torture under the definition set forth
in the applicable law, would be an affirmative defense and would therefore
have no bearing on whether the act in question meets the definition of tor-
ture. For example, as noted above, the DTA allows a defendant to assert an
affirmative good-faith defense where she reasonably lacked awareness that
the forms of detainee treatment she employed were not lawful; whether
these forms of treatment actually meet the legal definitions of torture or
cruel or inhuman treatment remains a separate inquiry.' Thus, while it is
true that some persons in control of detainees may engage in physical or
psychological coercion due to a belief that these forms of treatment are jus-
tifiable or a mistaken belief that they are actually lawful, these possibilities
133. See, e.g., Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Vio-
lence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 291, 315 & n.67 (1994).
134. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 99, at 1436.
135. See, e.g., CAT, supra note 2, at art. 2(2); ICCPR, supra note 7, at arts. 4, 7; Common
Article 3, supra note 78; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 8, 3.
136. ICCPR, supra note 7, at arts. 4(1)-(2); ICCPR Reservations, supra note 28 (providing
that article 4 of the ICCPR is not self-executing, but declining to attach any other reservations to that
article).
137. CAT, supra note 2, at art. 2(2).
138. See, e.g., Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the use of coer-
cive interrogation methods violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of a suspected serial rapist).
139. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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are irrelevant to the initial determination of whether the particular form of
treatment to which a detainee was subjected constituted an act of torture.
Critics may also point out that detainees-for example, those appre-
hended on a foreign battlefield during an armed conflict-and domestic
violence victims may be subject to very different legal regimes and levels of
constitutional protection. This observation is correct 40; however, the federal
criminal torture laws are concerned only with the behavior of the alleged
perpetrator, and make no distinctions on the basis of the detainee's legal
status.141 Under current federal law, as under international law, the fact that a
detainee is apprehended under particular circumstances, suspected of a par-
ticular offense, triable by a particular type of court or commission, or
subject to a particular subset of laws or protections makes no difference in
an assessment of whether a form of treatment to which the detainee was
subjected meets the definition of torture. 142The federal criminal torture laws,
like state domestic violence laws, are exclusively concerned with the actions
the defendant has allegedly committed, rather than the legal regime to which
the victim is subject-or any crime in which the victim has allegedly par-
ticipated.
In sum, although coercive interrogations and domestic violence take
place in different contexts and may be committed pursuant to different mo-
tives, the fact that is most salient to the present analysis-that both types of
abuse employ physical and psychological coercion, typically in combination
with isolation, in order to break the will of the victim and thereby force him
or her to become compliant-remains unchanged. When the perpetrator is a
person acting under color of law, this pattern of behavior is characterized as
"torture" or "cruel or inhuman treatment," or, at minimum, mistreatment;
when the perpetrator is a romantic partner or former romantic partner of the
victim, it is described as a domestic violence offense. These differing desig-
nations do not alter the essentially identical natures of the behaviors
involved.
IHl. OUTLAWING ABUSE: STATE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAWS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR A PROPOSED FEDERAL BAN ON SPECIFIC COERCIVE
INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES
Given the fundamental commonalities between coercive interrogations
and domestic violence described above, it makes sense to turn to U.S. state
laws criminalizing domestic violence in order to derive a federal ban on tor-
ture and cruel or inhuman treatment that is comprehensive and specific,
avoiding the problems of indeterminacy that undermine the current statutes.
Stated differently, these domestic violence laws would help to give content
to a new legal framework for the criminal torture laws premised on the idea
140. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 3.
142. See supra notes 3, 135-137 and accompanying text.
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of criminalizing the use of isolation and coercion to break the will of a de-
tainee and thereby obtain his compliance. The discussion below provides a
survey of the common relevant patterns and trends in the domestic violence
laws that American states have adopted, then draws upon these patterns in
creating a prototype for a revised federal statute criminalizing torture and
cruel or inhuman treatment in a specific and unambiguous manner.
A. Forms of Physical and Psychological Coercion Prohibited
Under State Domestic Violence Laws
American states have taken a variety of approaches to criminalizing
physical and psychological coercion between intimate partners. Some, like
Alabama, rely upon existing statutes prohibiting crimes such as assault and
impose sentencing enhancements if the accused and victim are (or were) inti-
mate partners.143 Others, such as Hawaii, provide that the commission of
certain crimes against an intimate partner will entitle the victim to obtain a
protection order (in addition to any civil or criminal remedies for the underly-
ing offense), and criminalize subsequent violations of this order.'" A few have
created freestanding domestic violence offenses, as Illinois did when it
adopted a statute prohibiting aggravated domestic battery. Regardless of the
approach taken, all have criminalized domestic abuse in some fashion'4 and
they have done so in a manner that exhibits consistent patterns. The requisite
mens rea for particular domestic violence crimes varies to some extent from
state to state, but knowledge and even recklessness are usually sufficient for a
finding of liability for some degree of domestic violence offense.147
The definitions most states employ in prohibiting acts of domestic vio-
lence are remarkably specific, and encompass forms of psychological
coercion (such as threats) as well as physical coercion. Where physical
abuse is concerned, the definitions typically include assault, 48 battery,149
reckless endangerment," 0 and insulting or offensive physical contact."' No-
tably, at least three states expressly prohibit choking and strangulation in the
143. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-130 to -132 (LexisNexis 2005).
144. HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 586-1, 586-3, 586-11(2006 & Supp. 2009).
145. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-3.3 (West 2002); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-2-
1.3 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
146. See State Surveys, supra note 95. The extent to which various state domestic violence
laws are effective in reducing the incidence of coercion between intimate partners is not addressed
in this Note.
147. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103(14) (West 2009); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-
21-3(a)(i) (West 2010); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102(a)(1) (West 2010).
148. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6203(a) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. § 741.28(2) (2010).
149. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-10(5) (2010); MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 750.81
(West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
150. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-132(a) (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.020(5)(f)
(West Supp. 2010).
151. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.1 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-
2-28(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
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domestic violence context, with two imposing heightened penalties for this
form of battery 1; whether these prohibitions constitute a pattern is debat-
able, but they may be indicative of an emerging trend. Bans on rape and
sexual assault or abuse are also explicitly incorporated into a large propor-
tion of domestic violence statutes. 53
A number of state domestic violence definitions provide that individuals
may not subject their intimate partners to false or unlawful imprisonment, a
practice that may be regarded as analogous to incommunicado detention in
the interrogation context (and includes elements of both physical and psy-
chological coercion).'1 Missouri, in particular, has adopted a detailed and
context-sensitive interpretation of the offense, banning the act of "know-
ingly attempt[ing] to cause or caus[ing] the isolation of [a] family or
household member by unreasonably and substantially restricting or limiting
such family or household member's access to other persons, telecommuni-
cation devices or transportation for the purpose of isolation."'5
Another practice that incorporates elements of both physical and psy-
chological coercion, and that is included in the domestic violence definitions
of at least fourteen states, is harassment.' The term's precise meaning var-
ies from state to state, but Oklahoma's is representative: "'Harassment'
means a knowing and willful course or pattern of conduct . .. directed at a
specific person which seriously alarms or annoys the person," "serves no
legitimate purpose," and "would cause a reasonable person to suffer sub-
stantial emotional distress."' 5 '
Although some state domestic violence definitions continue to focus
primarily on physical coercion, most also incorporate at least some forms of
psychological abuse. For example, nearly all states prohibit threats of physi-
cal violence to an intimate partner or, if intended to coerce or intimidate the
intimate partner, to others.' Several states ban the destruction of personal
property or the injury or killing of an animal in the context of domestic
violence, recognizing that such acts are often performed in order to
152. HAw. REV. STAT. § 709-906(8) (1993 & Supp. 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2247
(West 2009 & Supp. 2010); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.073 (West 1999 & Supp. 2010).
153. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6203(b); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103(14) (West
2009).
154. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 104 1(1)(g) (West 1999); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-
6303(1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2010).
155. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.074(1)(6).
156. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.66.990(3)(H) (West 2008); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 60/103(1) (West 2009); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1(I)(g) (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
13-2(C)(10) (West 2010).
157. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1(3) (West 2003). Additionally, this behavior "must actu-
ally cause substantial distress to the person." Id.; cf DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041(1)(d)
(prohibiting intimate partners from engaging in any "course of alarming or distressing conduct in a
manner which is likely to cause fear or emotional distress or to provoke a violent or disorderly re-
sponse").
158. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041(l)(b); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § I 101(l)(B)
(2002).
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intimidate the victim."9 As noted above, most of the statutes also place
some form of prohibition on insulting or offensive touching; harassment;
acts that create an apprehension of imminent bodily harm; or false impris-
onment, all of which may be regarded as forms of psychological coercion.
Bans on harassment found in domestic violence laws often outlaw some
forms of non-physical shaming or coercive behavior, such as the use of
"abusive or obscene language" or the distribution of sexually explicit im-
ages of the victim without his or her consent.'" Illinois explicitly prohibits
individuals from subjecting their intimate partners to "knowing, repeated
and unnecessary sleep deprivation," '6 and it is easy to imagine that other
states might also regard such a practice as banned under their harassment
provisions.
Finally, six states impose sweeping, generalized prohibitions on any
form of compulsion between intimate partners: a representative statute bans
the act of "[clompelling a person by force, threat of force or intimidation to
engage in conduct from which the person has a right or privilege to abstain
or to abstain from conduct in which the person has a right to engage."'62 Ex-
amples of such conduct that would translate easily into the interrogation
context might include being forced to drink urine, violate a strongly held
religious belief (e.g., by consuming a forbidden food or defacing a religious
image), starve, or commit a painful or humiliating act against a family
member.
It is true that some state domestic violence definitions are more exten-
sive than others and that physical coercion and threats are often more
comprehensively outlawed than non-physical forms of shaming or humilia-
tion. "' However, common relevant patterns in these state laws attach
culpability to at least the following acts between intimate partners if the re-
quisite mens rea is satisfied: isolation or false imprisonment; assault or
battery; reckless endangerment; abduction; threats of death or physical in-
jury to the victim or others, including family members or animals; insulting
or offensive physical contact; the forcible and unnecessary administration of
drugs or other substances without consent; interference with the victim's air
supply, such as through strangulation; rape and sexual assault, abuse, or hu-
miliation; destruction or threatened destruction of property in order to
coerce or intimidate; any course of conduct intended to produce substantial
159. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-800.3(1) (2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-6-2-34.5(4)
(West Supp. 2010).
160. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-1-8(a)(1)(b) (2005); ALASKA STAT. § II.61.120(a)(6). But
see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a(1) (West 2005) ("Verbal abuse or argument shall not consti-
tute family violence unless there is present danger and the likelihood that physical violence will
occur.").
161. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103(14)(ii).
162. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4002(1)(C) (1998); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-25
(2005); ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(l)(e) (1998); 750 ILL, COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103(1), (9); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 455.010(l)(c) (West 2003); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33.018 (LexisNexis 2006); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 10.99.020(5)(g), 9A.36.070 (West 2002).
163. See Johnson, supra note 122.
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emotional distress, potentially extending to sleep deprivation and verbal
degradation; and any other use of force, threats, or intimidation to compel
the victim to comply with the abuser's demands against his or her will.
B. A Revised Federal Statutory Prohibition of Torture
and Cruel or Inhuman Treatment
Based on the state domestic violence statutes described above, it is pos-
sible to derive a prototype for a revised federal definition of the crimes of
torture and cruel or inhuman treatment. This prototype statute represents a
framework for revising the laws-one that would facilitate expedient and
systematic revisions to the torture statutes but remain open to discussion and
modification.
The prototype incorporates each of the common domestic violence pro-
hibitions described above in Section III.A. A small number of other
domestic violence prohibitions sometimes found in state laws are, as a mat-
ter of common sense, generally inapplicable in the context of a detention
facility as opposed to a private residence, and have therefore been omitted
from the proposed torture statute; examples of these include trespassing,
burglary, 165 and arson. Inapplicable prohibitions of this kind are both
exceptional and easily identifiable, and may be omitted from the prototype
statute without compromising the logical coherence of the framework,
which is based upon coercion. These omissions merely reflect the fact that
detentions and interrogations typically do not take place within the de-
tainee's own residence, and that consequently trespassing, burglary, and
arson are not forms of coercion that would normally be available to a person
in control of the detainee. If a situation arose in which these types of acts
164. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-10(5) (2010); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 33.018(1)(e)(3).
165. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a)(11) (West 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 10.99.020(5)(h)-(i).
166. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3)(D) (2008); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33.018(1)(e)(2). One of the few remaining examples is continual surveillance, and in the context
of domestic violence, many states use stalking laws to ban such surveillance. See, e.g., CAL. FAM.
CODE § 6203(d) (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-6-2-34.5 (West 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-
1(2)(iv) (2003). In the detention context, it is unlikely that such surveillance would be employed as
part of a deliberate effort to coerce or frighten the detainee (as it is used to coerce and frighten do-
mestic violence victims), but if it were to be used in this manner-for example, in combination with
a compounding factor such as forced nudity-then a court could regard it falling within the scope of
provision (Q) of the prototype statute. See infra note 185 and accompanying text. In the domestic
violence context, detention itself can be prohibited in the form of false imprisonment laws, dis-
cussed supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text. As noted there, false imprisonment in the
domestic violence context is most properly analogized to incommunicado detention where detainees
are concerned, since both forms of mistreatment typically entail preventing the victim from main-
taining contact with anyone in the outside world-including those who could provide legal
assistance, medical or psychological treatment, or emotional support-for the purpose of coercion.
(For detainees, detention itself, when not incommunicado, is distinguishable in the sense that it is
not intended to produce compliance through the infliction of intolerable fear and psychological
distress.) Thus, prohibitions on false imprisonment in the domestic violence context form the basis




were in fact employed to terrify or otherwise coerce a detainee, then they
might be considered to fall within the scope of provision (Q) of the proto-
type (a residual clause based upon domestic violence provisions and
criminalizing purposeful engagement in any otherwise unlisted "course of
conduct intended to cause the detainee to experience substantial physical or
psychological distress").
Somewhat more problematic are those domestic violence prohibitions
that may exemplify emerging trends but do not yet enjoy a clear level of
consensus. 6 7 These prohibitions could be removed from the prototype tor-
ture statute at the legislature's discretion; however, any decision in this
regard should take account of whether those states that prohibit the act in
question do so because it operates to break the victim in the manner de-
scribed in Part II. If so, then the legislature may wish to retain the
prohibition in the context of detainee treatment even where it does not yet
enjoy widespread recognition among the states in the domestic violence
context.
The prototype statute prohibiting torture and cruel or inhuman treat-
ment "6 under federal criminal law based upon state domestic violence
provisions proposed by this Note reads as follows:
The terms "torture" and "cruel or inhuman treatment" are defined as:
(A) Knowingly causing the isolation of a detainee by unduly circumscribing
his access to other persons, such as legal representatives, consular rep-
resentatives, family members, representatives of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, clergy, or independent medical personnel,
including through abduction, physical restraint, threats, or any other
169means;
(B) Knowingly causing psychological distress in a detainee by limiting his
access to sensory stimuli; 70
(C) Recklessly engaging in conduct that results in, or creates a substantial
risk of, death or physical injury to the detainee;'
(D) Purposely engaging in conduct that results in, or creates a substantial
risk of, death or physical injury to a third party in order to coerce, pun-
ish, intimidate, or humiliate the detainee;"7
(E) Purposely creating an apprehension of death or imminent physical in-
jury to the detainee, including through express or implied threats, the
use or display of a deadly weapon, or other means;
167. See supra Section M.A.
168. See supra note 25.
169. Cf N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a)(6); supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
170. Cf supra notes 154-155, 161.
171. Cf supra note 150.
172. Cf supra notes 150, 158.
173. Cf supra notes 148-150.
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(F) Purposely creating apprehension of death or imminent physical injury
to a third party or to a vertebrate animal in order to coerce, punish, in-
timidate, or humiliate the detainee; 7 4
(G) Knowingly making physical contact of an offensive nature with the de-
. 75tainee;
(H) Knowingly compelling the detainee to assume or maintain a position
that causes physical pain, exhaustion, or unnecessary discomfort, in-
cluding but not limited to placing the detainee in a cramped space;
(I) Purposely administering or applying substances or medical or psychiat-
ric procedures resulting in stupor, unconsciousness, or physical or
mental distress or impairment to the detainee, without the detainee's in-
formed and voluntary consent and in the absence of strict medical or
psychiatric necessity;'
(J) Recklessly interfering with the detainee's air supply, such as through
suffocation or asphyxiation;17 8
(K) Raping the detainee, or raping a third party in order to coerce, punish,
intimidate, or humiliate the detainee;"'
(L) Sexually assaulting the detainee, or sexually assaulting a third party in
order to coerce, punish, intimidate, or humiliate the detainee;
(M) Purposely engaging in other conduct that is sexually humiliating to the
detainee;' 8'
(N) Purposely destroying the detainee's personal property in order to co-
erce, punish, intimidate, or humiliate the detainee;182
(0) Purposely using abusive or obscene language in order to coerce, punish,
intimidate, or humiliate the detainee;'
(P) Knowingly compelling the detainee by any other form of force, threat,
intimidation, or humiliation to engage in conduct from which the de-
tainee has a right or privilege to abstain or to abstain from conduct in
which the detainee has a right to engage;
174. Cf supra notes 148-150, 159.
175. Cf supra note 151.
176. Cf N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-19(a)(6), 2C:13-3; supra note 149.
177. Cf ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-305(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
178. Cf supra note 152.
179. Cf supra note 153.
180. Cf supra notes 153, 158.
181. Cf supra notes 153, 156-157, 160, 162.
182. Cf COLo. REV. STAT. § 18-6-800.3(1) (2010).
183. Cf supra note 160.
184. Cf supra note 162.
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(Q) Purposely engaging in any other course of conduct intended to cause
the detainee to experience substantial physical or psychological dis-
185tress;
(R) Attempting to commit any act described in (A)-(Q); or
(S) Threatening explicitly or implicitly to commit any act described in (A)-
(D), (G)-(N), or (Q).
Whether a course of conduct should be punished as torture or, altema-
tively, as the lesser offense of cruel or inhuman treatment could be
determined by the legislature or by the courts, based on factors such as the
number of times the defendant allegedly subjected a detainee to these acts or
whether the acts in question were committed singly or in combination. The
legislature may also further define terms such as "unduly" (paragraph (A))
and "offensive" (paragraph (G)). The prototype statute's structure is in-
tended to be flexible enough to accommodate these changes while still
solving the problem of facial vagueness described in Part I in a comprehen-
sive and consistent manner.
CONCLUSION
As presently drafted, American criminal laws purporting to prohibit tor-
ture and cruel or inhuman treatment are facially indeterminate with regard to
the actus reus, mens rea, and result requirements of these offenses, jeopard-
izing the statutes' ability to prevent acts of torture and provide adequate
notice to persons in control of detainees regarding which forms of treatment
may result in criminal liability. While the DTA and President Obama's ex-
ecutive order limiting interrogation techniques to those approved in the
Army Field Manual represent steps toward imposing more specific bans on
mistreatment in the detention and interrogation contexts, they do not consti-
tute a permanent or adequate solution to the problem of vagueness. It is
therefore likely that confusion and legal controversy regarding the meaning
of the torture laws will continue to arise within the agencies most responsi-
ble for complying with and enforcing them-unless Congress substantially
revises the statutes.
As the preceding discussion shows, there is a sound basis for adopting
criminal prohibitions on specific forms of detainee treatment based on the
behaviors states have outlawed in their domestic violence provisions. Tor-
ture and domestic violence are both manifestations of a single well-
documented pattern of human behavior: the use of isolation, physical pain,
and psychological degradation to gain control over a resistant individual;
instill in him a sense of hopelessness, helplessness, and dependence; and
thereby gain his compliance. Abusive interrogators employ physically and
psychologically coercive methods to "break" detainees in precisely the same
manner that abusive partners employ coercion to "break" their victims; in
other words, torture and domestic violence are the fruit of the same behav-
185. Cf supra notes 156-157.
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ioral tree. Given these facts, it makes sense to look to the states' bans on
physical and psychological forms of domestic violence in order to derive a
framework for adopting specific and unambiguous prohibitions on torture
and cruel or inhuman treatment in the interrogation setting. Persons in con-
trol of detainees, the policymakers who govern their actions, and society at
large would all benefit from these clearer criminal laws, which would not
only provide unmistakable notice regarding the acts proscribed, but would
also help to make concrete the absolute and universal rejection of torture
that all three branches of government have recognized as a fundamental
principle of the American legal system.
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